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Abstract 
This Special Issue advances an interpretive research programme into Foreign Policy Analysis 
and International Relations by showcasing new work on the study of foreign policy and 
regional cooperation. This introductory article explains the rationale and contents of the 
Special Issue in three parts. The opening part explains how the contributions complement the 
broader study of ideas in Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through a 
critique of methodological positivism in the social sciences. The second part elaborates the 
theoretical framework used to cohere the collection, which centres on the study of ‘situated 
agents’ who, when confronted with policy dilemmas, draw on inherited traditions to inform 
their foreign policy practices. This is accompanied by a methods case study centring on David 
Cameron’s European Union referendum strategy, which is used to illustrate the practical ways 
in which one can conduct interpretivist research into foreign policy. In conclusion, we spell 
out how the contributors conducted their work to advance the interpretivist research 
programme. 
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This Special Issue works at the nexus of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and International 
Relations (IR) to develop an interpretivist research programme into foreign policy decision-
making.1  Our objective is to contribute to the broad genres of literature on: individuals (or 
Irving Janis’s cohesive ‘groups’) in foreign policy decision-making,2 as well as the 
constructivist work in IR which argues that foreign policy activity is, at heart, a realm of 
social practice.3 This work persuasively suggests that, just as with individual agents operating 
in domestic polities,4 state behaviour in the international realm can be explained as a form of 
social practice, unfolding in a world of cognition, perception and misperception, and the 
generation of intersubjective meanings about how the world ‘works’ and the intentions of 
different actors within it.5  
Since the study of identity constructions are a prominent feature of the work in this 
Special Issue it speaks in particular to the elements of this extant work dealing with the 
identity-based as well as the material and institutional sources of foreign policy adaptation.6 
As Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein have suggested, identities ‘refer to shared 
representations of a collective self’ and can be accessed, as the contributors do here, using a 
variety of sources (mainly those produced by elites in the relatively ‘closed’ foreign policy 
communities studied by our contributors) which home in on ‘collective beliefs about the 
definition of the group and its membership’ and are also ‘revealed by social practices as well 
as by political attitudes shaped by social and geographical structures and national contexts’7 – 
not to mention inherited traditions handed down through history. These traditions, ‘what 
might be termed the political culture of foreign policy’ inform elite thought about their 
country’s international role ‘and the strategic habits that have evolved from that role’.8    
We thus see the work showcased here as feeding onto two sets of literature in 
particular. On the one hand the ‘classic’ FPA scholarship on individual cognition and the 
cultural and domestic factors shaping national ‘style’ and content of foreign policies.9 On the 
other, the recently reinvigorated ‘linguistic turn’ in constructivism and post-structuralism,10 
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and the cognate ‘international practices’ turn,11 both of which privilege the construction of 
national subjectivities in sustaining the social fabric of international life. These have usefully 
being applied to the analysis of regional and transnational governance as well as national 
cases.12 In the spirit of these literatures we treat discourse and other data about elite beliefs as 
analytical prisms through which we can see identity issues unpacked, external and internal 
pressures on foreign policy being perceived, and different sources of material power and 
influence being weighed up and acted upon to produce foreign policy decisions. This is an 
explicitly constructivist move that sidesteps blunt recourse to material explanations (as 
detailed in the next section) by showing how the beliefs of key decision-makers are 
fundamental to explaining foreign policy outcomes. As Dan Reiter has explained, beliefs are 
important because they ‘are used to inform decisions in the face of uncertainty. Beliefs are 
derived from interpretations of past events’,13 meaning that they have a direct bearing on day 
to day policy practices as well as being part of a wider national conversation with the history 
of the nation. The contributors to this Special Issue deal explicitly with the presence of the 
past in the present. 
A significant way of accessing information about foreign policy ‘mind-sets and 
actions’, is, noted Christopher Hill, through a close study of the language of foreign policy, 
which helps unpack the beliefs on which foreign policy practices are based. However, the 
study of ‘discourse’ is an important but not the only means used in this collection,14 which 
covers a diverse range of national, comparative, and regional cases. Concurring with Theda 
Skocpol’s characterization of states as ‘Janus-faced’ entities which look outwards and inwards 
simultaneously,15 we account for patterns of foreign policy change and continuity ‘through a 
contextual approach which locates the state at the intersection of two environments – the 
international and domestic’.16  Our theoretical focus is on the beliefs that come to be held by 
‘situated agents’  (the decision-makers, usually at the apex of foreign policy machineries) 
charged with drawing on prior foreign policy traditions to identify the national interest and the 
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scope and limits for foreign policy action they see as flowing from dilemmas they encounter 
in the international arena. These dilemmas might be foreign policy ‘crises’ that challenge 
preconceptions about the behaviour of another state or international actor. Dilemmas can also 
arise in the form of new information or knowledge about ‘routine’ or non-urgent foreign 
policy matters.  
The articles presented in the Special Issue cohere around a theoretical framework 
centring on the study of ‘situated agents’ responding to policy dilemmas by drawing on – and 
sometimes adapting – foreign policy traditions in response to dilemmas. We see this 
framework, which puts the methodological focus on ‘situated agents’ as foreign policy 
decision-makers, as an enormously useful way of developing the foreign policy and 
international politics literatures mentioned above.17 To frame the contributions that follow we 
begin by presenting interpretivist approaches to explaining foreign policy practices, rooted in 
a critique of methodological positivism in the social sciences. In the second part, we use a 
review of previous work on foreign policy traditions as the basis for discussing the Special 
Issue’s research programme. This programme is themed around the idea that ‘situated agents’ 
draw on inherited foreign policy traditions when confronting policy dilemmas, and the 
practices that result give meaning to the action undertaken. How far this leads to a 
reconfiguration of the prior foreign policy traditions is a question that needs answering on a 
case by case basis, opening the way for the individual articles presented in the rest of the 
collection.  
   
Explanation, Interpretation and Explanation through Interpretation 
As the etymology of the word ‘interpret’ indicates, from the Latin interpretari, the 
interpretivist agenda is to explain, expound, and understand. The interpretive approach 
balances the goals of explanation and understanding often, incorrectly, said to be 
incommensurable in IR.18 This position rests on the assumption that explanations for political 
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action follow from an empathetic understanding of the social meanings that underpin political  
activity, especially ‘how the processes of social representations are formed and internalized’ 
in the realm of the ‘international’. Interpretivists are comfortable seeking answers to ‘why’ 
questions through an investigation of ‘how’ things came to be, rather than falling back on a 
covering-law model that posits: (i) the identification of an ‘initial condition statement’ will (ii) 
flag up the applicability of relevant scientific law(s) leading (iii) to an outcome that holds in 
all cases in which conditions (i) and (ii) are met.19 Coming from a desire to make the social 
and natural worlds more predictable, in this model too much work is done by abstract and 
putatively deterministic ‘structures’ which act as outside ‘variables’ pushing and pulling 
agents into performing certain actions irrespective of their own intentions, interests, beliefs, 
normative or ethical desires, and a capacity not just for purposive agents not only to identify 
lessons but also to change their beliefs and associated behaviour as a result.  
This point can be illustrated by looking momentarily to another field, the law, where 
narrative modes of explanation are fully accepted as the basis for making adjudications 
between parties in dispute.20 Qualitative evidence is gathered to create rival narratives (the 
prosecution narrative and the defence narrative), with the final judgement resting for judge 
and jury on which narrative seems best to explain the timeline of events as (usually) agreed by 
the parties. Particularly since the ‘cultural turn in legal studies’ the study of narratology is 
now seen as a prerequisite to unpacking such vital matters as sequencing and the causal 
presentation of events in which ‘facts’ are imbued with normative properties by virtue of 
being embedded in stories about the past.21  
Narrative explanations rooted in empathetic understanding of agents’ beliefs and 
practices can act as a useful counterbalance in FPA and IR to the covering-law model, which 
has been embraced via methodological positivism. This interweaves three propositions. First, 
it advances the utility of a natural science or natural science-like epistemology which 
identifies knowledge with the production of covering laws of the ‘if X, then Y’ variety 
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described above. Second, it equates the existence of an object with its observability, which 
makes it easier to study the physical than the social world. Third, it draws a distinction 
between the observer on the one hand and the object being studied on the other. The observer 
ideally remains detached and ‘outside’, instead of being a participant in the events being 
classified and linked together in relationships of dependence in a causal chain.22 The scientist 
in this idealised version is ‘a mere processor of information like a computer’, so ‘the 
assumption is that both the data and the processor are neutral, with no ability to alter the ways 
in which the question or its answer is understood’.23 Normatively speaking, methodologically 
positive scientists do not ‘interpret’ their data, they merely report ‘findings’. 
Methodological positivism has left an indelible mark on FPA and IR through recourse 
to different forms of ‘structure’ which are said to mould national foreign policy choices, not 
entirely but quite often removing the ‘human’ element from explanations of state behaviour 
on the world stage.24 States in this image are treated as unitary actors possessing unchanging 
interests in safeguarding their own security in an anarchic system lacking the means either of 
ordering itself from below or having order imposed on it from above. Realists, for example, 
posit that foreign policy choices are the product of the distribution of material capabilities. 
Liberal theorists, particularly institutionalists and constructivists, accept the same anarchic 
power-driven ontology of international relations but argue that the creation and maintenance 
of international organizations and ‘regimes’ changes the calculus facing decision-makers and 
can lead to more cooperative ventures among states signed up to the idea of acting in concert 
rather than alone, especially through the evolution of transnational norms which regulate 
expectations and provide more information and certainty for international action.25 States use 
these regimes a repositories of norms ‘to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of 
international behavior in various issue-areas’.26 In other words, rationally calculating unitary 
states craft organizations and regimes ‘to create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of 
shared goals’.27  
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In putting this case liberal constructivists share more in common with their supposed 
disciplinary ‘others’, the Realists, than is often supposed. For example, many of the classical 
Realists, including Hans Morgenthau, drew explicit attention to the social and ideational 
aspects of the exercise of material power. Look at Morgenthau’s nine ‘elements of national 
power’ in Politics Among Nations: geography (size; position); natural resources; industrial 
capacity; military preparedness; population (not size but the will to pull at the material levers 
of power internationally); national ‘character’; national morale; quality of diplomacy; quality 
of government.28 In theory, the possession of huge material capability would in the 
Morgenthau view be rendered useless if there was not the will amongst leaders of publics to 
deploy it effectively. The will of leaders is clearly a social choice that depends on things such 
as individual leader beliefs, bureaucratic tugs of war, and democratic dialogue involving the 
public and civil society actors.  
Unfortunately, the study of the social choices underpinning political action became 
marginalised in the work of the methodological positivists who became leading figures in the 
development of IR as a distinct subfield of study, especially so in US academia after the 
Second World War. For example, Kenneth Waltz’s brand of Neorealism in the later 1970s 
attempted to create a ‘science’ of international politics using modelling techniques drawn 
from Economics to create a ‘systemic’ theory of international politics.29 Significantly, Waltz’s 
work was spurred by a critique of reductionist theories of international political behavior 
which relied on the individual and national level explanations for foreign policy action that 
feature prominently in this Special Issue. Waltz’s discussion of the background beliefs that 
shape foreign policy decision-making was heavily constrained because all states were 
assumed to share the same goals. He accented military and economic factors in the creation 
and sustenance of the balance of power; but he left behind the presumably less easy to 
observe final five components of Morgenthau’s list, as well as his own earlier reflections on 
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war as a social activity undertaken at the behest of humans organized into separate 
collectivities with different visions of who ‘they’ are in relation to ‘others’ in the world.30  
Responding to this position, interpretivists agree with those in FPA and IR identified 
at the beginning of this article, who work on the assumption, succinctly put by J. David 
Singer, that people experience things while institutions do not, so how can we account for 
‘causes’ of a nation’s foreign policy if we do not include ‘the media by which external 
conditions and factors are translated into a policy decision?’31 Interpretivists  are interested in 
accounting for the ways in which ‘Material attributes feed into conceptions of the national 
role, in a way that then shapes behaviour; but [also how] a state’s behaviour then affects 
national attributes in turn’.32 In the study of foreign policy, as this collection shows, 
interpretivists might operate using many and varied methods and sources, but two goals are 
common to all such accounts of foreign policy action. First, to identify the meanings 
embedded in agents’ practices. Second, to explain these meanings by locating them in their 
social, cultural, institutional and historical contexts. The next part of the article will explain 
the theoretical framework used by contributors in this collection to explain the foreign policy 
practices of the situated agents whose practices they account for via a study of the beliefs 
underpinning the practices.  
 
Foreign Policy Traditions, Dilemmas and Situated Agency 
The research programme in this collection uses a set of concepts which aims to give empirical 
depth, particularly on the historical side, to a number of contexts within which foreign policy 
activity occurs.33 Given that this framework and the accompanying epistemological position 
on structure and agency is fundamental to the research showcased in the Special Issue, this 
section begins by explaining the concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘dilemma’ using extant research, 
shows how they inform our position on situated agency, and ends by clarifying the concepts 
by explaining how an interpretivist study might unfold methodologically speaking  using the 
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case study of David Cameron’s policy for a referendum on Britain’s membership of the 
European Union (EU). 
We begin with the concept of ‘tradition’, a term that crops up frequently in the study 
of foreign policy. A good example is Andrei Tsygankov’s 2014 article on the dynamics of 
Russian foreign policy decision-making. His starting point was that interpretive perspectives 
are not antithetical to explanatory perspectives because the ‘why’ of foreign policy can be 
addressed through a consideration of the ‘how’ and ‘in which contexts’ foreign policy activity 
takes place. In his view, a combination of material capabilities and the layered interactions of 
all actors involved in and outside the state can create heavily constrained ideational 
possibilities for decision-makers, ‘but not enough to deprive them of meaningful choices’.34 
Suggestively for our purposes Tsygankov pointed out that IR has developed around ‘Western’ 
and especially US concerns, so one very obvious benefit of bringing an interpretive approach 
to a range of other cases is that it brings in specificities of locally meaningful action in 
countries and regions often theorized away by the scholarly community.35 Tsygankov 
interpreted Dmitri Medvedev’s European Security Policy in a series of steps which took in his 
actions and statements towards Europe, his speeches, Medvedev’s reference to other ‘national 
schools of thought’ on foreign policy, international reactions, and in light of Medvedev’s 
experience of what he deemed to be other similar cases from the past (on Russia see Ekaterina 
Koldunova’s article below).    
Other examples from case studies around the globe bear testament to the significance 
but also the complexities involved in identifying the nature and impact of traditions in the 
study of foreign policy. First, according to William Callahan, in China the ancient concept of 
Tianxia (‘All-under-Heaven’) has made a recent reappearance in elite foreign policy 
discourse, imposing memories of the hierarchies of imperial China on proposals for new 
approaches to world order (on China see Frank Gaenssmantel’s article below).36 Second, 
accounts of American foreign policy have alighted on the ways in which historical traditions 
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inform foreign policy outcomes, although there is little consensus on how best to package 
them analytically speaking. Washington foreign policy decisions are variously held to be the 
product of contestation between different strands of thought on ‘isolationism’ and global 
‘commitment’, the legacy of partition/union and multiculturalism, and/or the product of 
imagery around ‘immigrants and frontiersmen’.37 Interwoven with these the American 
‘democracy tradition’, writes Nicolas Bouchet, is ‘a fundamental narrative for thinking about, 
making and presenting foreign policy’ regardless of whether the president is Democrat or 
Republican (Andras Szalai studies US nuclear strategizing in his article below).38  
Third, to understand Brazil’s foreign policy E. Bradford Burns informs us that we 
need look no further than ‘the founder of its modern foreign policy, the Baron of Rio-Branco 
and his foreign policy manifesto from 1964 (Brazil as a regional actor features in Elisa Lopez-
Lucia’s article below).39 Fourth, in Canada, a ‘new’ internationalist slant to foreign policy at 
the turn of the twenty first century has been traced back to the intermingling of Liberal 
discourse with Conservative practices, reflecting a uniquely strong commitment to a UN-led 
world order in Canadian foreign policy.40 Fifth, historical memory and a fast paced back-and-
forth between perceptions of past and present feature in David Jones and Andrea Benvenuti’s 
study of Australian foreign policy, where traditions are said to be composed of ‘myths’ about 
national identity and the country’s role regionally and globally.41 For Frank Bongiorno the 
influence of the Liberal Party’s Robert Gordon Menzies was a significant factor in the 
invention of Australian foreign policy thought, particularly his views on the British 
Commonwealth.42 In Europe, sixth, Finland’s foreign policy tradition is said to have been 
shaped by its troublesome and tragic relations with Russia and the popularization of ideas 
about ‘survival’ and ‘progress’.43 Seventh, Silvio Berlusconi’s foreign policy is argued to be 
based on some very strong traditions in Italian foreign policy, pro-Americanism and a 
Euroscepticism echoing an exceptionalist reading of the Italian past.44 Finally, work on the 
dissident tradition on Czech Republic foreign policy argues likewise, that to unpack a 
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tradition we rely on a close study of norm-promoting agents’ beliefs as well as the material 
conditions under which foreign policy is made.45 In Britain, finally, developments in foreign 
policy are commonly explained with reference to the ways in which foreign policy 
entrepreneurs construe the balance between the traditions of Atlanticism, Empire and 
Europeanism, the stories these tell them about the national interest usually working 
synergistically with inherited party political traditions to give shape and meaning to foreign 
policy actions (feeding the articles below by Oliver Daddow and Falk Ostermann).46   
Not all of the scholars producing the literature above share one method of researching 
foreign policy, nor do they entirely agree on how to package and describe the traditions that 
they set out to interpret. This Special Issue extends the ‘problematique’ by including 
comparative work on complex international organisations (see Elin Hellquist’s article) and 
regional leaders (Lopez-Lucia). Nonetheless, across this corpus as a whole we find reference 
to at least one of the following attributes of a foreign policy tradition. First, traditions are 
bound up with collective folk memories crystallizing around shared (usually national but 
sometimes regional, as in the early European Economic Community) myths and memories 
coming from experiences of war and peace, conflict and insecurity, heroism and treachery, 
defeat and victory, violence and generosity, and the normative debates that accompany them 
about national rights, duties and obligations flowing from them (see Matteo Dian’s piece 
below). Second, traditions are constantly reinterpreted by elites in light of current challenges 
they encounter domestically and internationally. Finally, although traditions are routinely 
found to ‘stick’ and/or to be impervious to rapid change, there is nothing predictable or 
structurally deterministic about their influence on foreign policy beliefs – the beliefs of agents 
themselves have to be the starting point for an interpretive account.  
We therefore define a tradition as a set of understandings someone receives during 
socialization. This definition underscores the communicative aspect of a tradition which has 
written and oral dimensions and through which ‘narratives of the past’ become ‘community 
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process in the present’ through the social ‘transmission of rumour and legend’.47 Having 
sketched the idea of a tradition, we can now consider the notion of dilemma, and why this 
makes a study of ‘situated agents’ beneficial to the study of foreign policy. A dilemma arises 
for an individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices 
and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated tradition. Agent-centred 
dilemmas bear the weight of causality in interpretive accounts of political change. Change for 
interpretivists occurs contingently (but not randomly) as people reinterpret, modify, or 
transform an inherited tradition in response to novel circumstances or other dilemmas.  
A good example from the foreign policy literature comes from the case of New 
Zealand. David McCraw has examined how the archetypal ‘Realism’ of the National Party 
made way for an increasing dose of ‘internationalism’ in foreign policy through the 1990s. 
This change was brought about by two factors: the National Party’s relative weakness 
compared to other political parties and its concomitant willingness to incorporate elements of 
their agenda into its own; and a greater attentiveness to public opinion in the formation of 
foreign policy. ‘Pragmatic adaptation’ to the recognition of governance dilemmas was the 
order of the day for the National Party. The process of adaptation weakened the Realist hold 
over the New Zealand foreign policy tradition.48 None of this could straightforwardly have 
been ‘read off’ the National Party’s previous foreign policy record as the party of government, 
or the beliefs of the leaders expressed by those responsible for foreign policy when they took 
office.  
Just as units and structures in international relations are mutually constitutive (states 
make the structure and the structure makes states),49 so individuals and cohesive groups of 
decision-makers are capable of responding to dilemmas creatively, setting ‘current policy 
questions in terms of past experiences’.50 In the process of deliberating and seeking out guides 
to action from analogous situations in the past,51 agents are positioned within ideational and 
institutional traditions but they are capable of modifying these traditions through their agency, 
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such that agency occurs against a particular historical background that influences it without 
determining it. The situated-ness of agency draws attention to the inherited practices and 
social relationships that influence individual decisions. An agent’s response to a dilemma is 
difficult to ‘read off’ from her or his nominal ‘location’ on an organizational flowchart in a 
foreign policy process because that is merely the positional setting for the taking of a 
decision. Their organizational ‘rank’ (‘she would say that, she’s the Secretary of State’) will 
rarely provide an agent with all the answers to a policy problem. Decisions, particularly on 
complex foreign policy problems, are likely to require domestic as well as foreign policy 
input, not least from the decision-maker’s close team of advisers, as well as the other 
institutions of government: intelligence and security agencies, home offices, ministries of 
defence, ministries for international development, trade and business departments. Depending 
on the time available to make the decision, advice, information and opinion may be sought 
from non-governmental stakeholders such as think-tanks and political consultancies either on 
a formal or ad hoc basis. Decision-makers may also seek counsel and information from 
journalists and academics.  
Furthermore, an agent’s response to a dilemma cannot be ‘read off’ biographical facts 
about them, whether childhood (‘her mother was American’), education (‘she studied at 
Harvard’) or career (‘she used to be in oil’). Biographical facts are at most background 
contexts that help to explain how and why the individual arrived at the current point. They do 
not determine responses to dilemmas which will likely pull an individual in a number of ways 
– personally (with advisers, speechwriters, researchers and confidantes), politically (the party 
management dimension), institutionally (the wider decision-making configuration of 
government and relations with other government colleagues) and internationally via pressure 
from outside actors, friend/enemy and state/non-state alike. This Special Issue is interested in 
probing the dilemmas that confront policy-makers with challenges of all different varieties, 
and across a range of national and international settings. 
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There is also the ‘inside’ of states to consider. Domestic political realignments,52 such 
as the emergence of new parties in the party system, or political challenges coming from 
powerful voices within the national polity (such as the media), may produce dilemmas that 
require new positions to be adopted on foreign policy issues. At this point, therefore, we use a 
case study to elucidate how the key interpretivist insights garnered from the research 
programme in this Special Issue can inform the study of foreign policy decisions in practice. 
Hopefully this will help answer the following key question about this enterprise: ‘What does 
interpretivist research look like?’  
The example chosen is UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s January 2013 pledge to 
hold a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU during the 2015-2020 parliament. 
Evidently this move was undertaken to quell backbench dissent from his Conservative Party, 
as a response to growing media pressure to settle the EU question,53 and to head off the 
challenge to Cameron’s party coming from the right of the political spectrum in the form of 
the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP). The referendum outcome will have huge 
economic and strategic implications for Britain globally and domestically, but neither the fact 
of the referendum nor its timing could have been predicted with reference to Cameron’s prior 
‘pragmatic’ stance on the Europe issue, the material conditions in Britain in the ‘age of 
austerity’, or Britain’s ‘standing’ in the EU at the time. Referendums on different aspects of 
the ‘Europe’ question had been hinted at, half-promised and then not taken place under 
Cameron’s Labour predecessors in government; the previous one coming in 1975. In this 
example Cameron can be seen to have operated as a situated agent, meaning in the words of 
Walter Carlsnaes, that ‘human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense 
intertwined entities, and hence that we cannot account fully for the one without invoking the 
other’.54  
Cameron’s policy decision (the referendum) can be understood as a response to his 
reading of the pressures incumbent upon him from his position as Prime Minister of the 
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United Kingdom (and therefore symbolic guardian of the ‘national interest’), as leader of the 
Conservative Party (very deeply divided over the Europe question since Margaret Thatcher’s 
time), and as European statesman putting forward his preferred ‘vision’ for the future EU. 
These pressures Lawrence Freedman described in 1976 as those emanating from an 
individual’s beliefs about the ‘rules of the game’ at a moment of decision.55 None of them 
alone or in tandem compelled Cameron to adopt the foreign policy strategy he did; as noted 
above, previous leaders such as Tony Blair had made a point of trying to avoid a referendum 
at all costs. But time moved on, political calculations changed, and so did the domestic and 
international environments, notably the rise of UKIP domestically and, abroad, the legitimacy 
crisis in the EU. The factors Cameron seems to have considered in his decision-making were: 
first, his understanding of the immediate and longer term history of the British experience of 
European integration; second, his appreciation of the depth of the European fissures in the 
post-Thatcher Conservative Party; third, his reading of Britain’s ‘place’ in an EU that was 
heading into potential trouble post-Eurozone crisis; and finally, his reading of Britain’s 
capacity to ‘reform’ different aspects of ‘Europe’ which the British, and others in the EU, find 
unpalatable, including its major institutions especially the European Court of Justice, and the 
underlying philosophical commitment by member states to ‘ever closer union’.56  
Evaluating the weight given by Cameron to the various pressures seemingly upon him 
could result in a two-step interpretivist research programme, searching for information on 
what ‘Europe’ meant to Cameron in material, political and ideational and affective terms, and 
how those meanings became translated into practice. In the first stage we would ask: what did 
Cameron make of the benefits of Britain’s membership of the EU? Why was the prime 
minister critical of the EU institutions – this links to the views of Eurosceptical activists 
prominent in Conservative Party and the largely Conservative-supporting media? Why did 
Cameron believe Britain could remain a ‘global’ power through membership of the EU, and 
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why did he marginalise alternative visions for Britain’s future world role, such as that centred 
on the ‘Anglosphere’?57  
The second stage of the research would be to identify how Cameron drew on and/or 
adapted traditions of thought about the British in Europe, and how this question was 
‘managed’ in the various political and bureaucratic settings in which he operated: within 
Cabinet, his Party, with his Liberal Democrat coalition partners in the 2010-2015 parliament, 
and with elements of the bureaucratic machinery outside Downing Street, notably the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office and Treasury. There would also be questions asked of the currents 
of thought about ‘Britain and Europe’ that pose dilemmas for the decision-making process, 
not least the influential British Eurosceptic press and wider media coverage, think-tanks, and 
those day-to-day cultural representations of Europe in Britain that help mould the climate of 
ideas from ‘below’ as it were.  
A privileged few may be able to interview Cameron, his Europe advisers and 
speechwriters (a circle which since 2015 has been added to quite considerably)58 about the 
beliefs that informed his European policy practices. This is an ‘ideal type’ research design that 
would require considerable resources, time and, when it comes to interviews, greater access to 
government decision-makers than is usually afforded ‘outsiders’ investigating national foreign 
policy decision-making. However, there are plenty of ‘on the record’ sources such as 
speeches, policy documents, parliamentary questions, election manifestoes, newspaper 
articles, legislation and media reporting to help interpret the manner in which Cameron, a 
powerful agent embedded in various ideational and institutional settings domestically and 
internationally, exerted his agency to develop, justify and execute his referendum strategy.  
This example of interpretivism-in-action indicates that foreign policy decision-making on the 
part of situated agents can be advanced through the framework of traditions and dilemmas, 
which develops explanations for foreign policy practices by teasing out the links between 
beliefs and the meaning these are given through foreign policy activity. 
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Conclusion 
We draw this piece to a close with a word on the articles in the Special Issue, accompanied by 
some final reflections on the framework used to interpret the foreign policy decisions of 
‘situated agents’. The purpose of this article was to set out the rationale for, and goals of, a 
theoretical framework that adds to the now rich study of foreign policy decision-making from 
within FPA and IR. The articles cover a range of cases from around the globe, their span 
being a useful way of testing the framework across many foreign policy horizons, and at both 
the national and organizational levels: Russia, Nigeria and Brazil, the Organization of African 
Unity and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan, China, France, Britain and the 
US. Each contributor was asked to consider several inter-related research questions. First, 
what are the leading debates and representations about national identity acting as background 
traditions? Second, how did these traditions relate to other traditions of knowledge about the 
national role in the world, for example coming from particular partisan or sectional interests 
such as academia and think-tanks? Third, how did particular thinkers or groups within politics 
and civil society modify and renegotiate these traditions in response to dilemmas?  Fourth, 
what foreign policy dilemmas did decision-makers see themselves facing? Finally, how did 
traditions evolve over time (if at all) upon the resolution of those dilemmas?  
Clearly, different cases require different accents and the key for each contributor was 
to justify who were the ‘situated agents’ they felt it important to study, and to explain how 
they did this using the range of interpretive methods on offer. The use of narrative modes of 
explanation is, however, central to all the articles, as is a widespread use of formal or informal 
modes of discourse analysis of documents written or spoken by the key agents studied. All of 
the articles, therefore approach the subject through the eyes of the agents deemed to be the 
key ‘movers and shakers’ in the foreign policy communities in which they operated, giving 
written and spoken sources relating to foreign policy a privileged role in the account of 
18 
 
events. The various decision-makers studied are treated as socially situated and socially 
constituted, resulting in a dynamic interplay between beliefs and practices. The contributions 
thus can be read as standalone examples of interpretivism ‘in action’ and as part of a broader 
dialogue with the cognate and wide-ranging literatures in FPA and IR on structure and 
agency, constructed identities, institutional politics, and the uses of history and learning in 
foreign policy, not to mention the specifics of the national and international organization 
cases themselves.  
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